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Abstract 
This paper sets to address the legal question of how the 
Censor Board can exercise such power and whether it 
represents the mood and approach of the government 
towards films and art forms in general, in India. What 
history tells us is quite contrary to what we're witnessing 
today. Our Constitution makers, while debating on the 
topic of freedom of speech and expression invoked 
libertarian philosophers like Isaiah Berlin and John Stuart 
Mill, and their philosophy did in fact, find its way into the 
said provision. The present scenario however, is one 
where we have departed from these libertarian ideas. 
What the censor board is doing today is trying to choke 
the marketplace of ideas at its source, which Gautam 
Bhatia calls 'prior restraint' in his new book Offend, Shock 
or Disturb. The paper tries to establish how the law of 
censorship, whenever rigid, has only suppressed thought 
and dissent, instead of allowing progressive and rational 
thinking. This is substantiated by analysing various case 
laws. 
Keywords: Censorship, Obscenity test, Moral regulation, Prior 
restraint, Reasonable restrictions 
1. Introduction 
Censorship and the law in any state reflect the mood of the 
majority, in some way or the other. The choices made by any 
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regime – democratic or otherwise – come from an electoral 
confidence, and mandate. An artist, at any given point of time, is 
reacting to life around him. And is willing to dissent and talk about 
things that he/she does not like or wants to improve. To that end, 
it‟s an ongoing battle with any government that is in power, 
because dissent is almost always against prevailing control. The 
most clever and intelligent regimes leave spaces open for dissent 
because that keeps base urges weak. Whenever control becomes 
unreasonable, the voices also gather steam and increased resolve. 
Self-censorship is probably the biggest challenge in moments like 
these, but the strongest voices are often the most fearless.1 
In February this year, when the Censor Board, in continuation of its 
irrational and unreasoned bans, decided to deny the film 
certification to the film 'Lipstick Under My Burkha' for its 
"continuous sexual scenes, abusive words, audio pornography"2 
and also for it being "lady oriented and about their fantasy about 
life", the film industry first had to recover from the shock that it 
inflicted, before proceeding to protest against it. But what makes 
such an illogical restraint on freedom of speech and expression 
legally possible, although not justifiable?  
2. Freedom of Speech & Expression in India 
The Indian Constitution demonstrates through its various 
provisions, how complex segmented societies may adopt a complex 
segmented constitution. Our founding fathers understood the need 
for not only 'national identity' but also 'individual identity' and 
took up a gradual approach towards achieving it. Out of the many 
special features that our Constitution carries, one of its most 
important ones is the policy of accommodation, which to Granville 
Austin, was one of the original contributions to the process of 
constitution making. In the Assembly, as Austin argued, the 
                                                          
1 Swagat Baruah, Faces Interview With Kanu Behl, Catharsis Magazine(April 
7, 2017), https://catharsismagazine.com/2017/04/07/faces-kanu-behl/. 
2 Censor Board refuses to certify Lipstick Under My Burkha, The Hindu (New 
Delhi)(Feb. 23, 2017, 06:07 PM),<http://www.thehindu.com/ 
entertainment/movies/censor-board-refuses-certificate-to-lady-oriented-
lipstick-under-my-burkha/article17353939.ece.> 
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members had divergent views on a number of key issues and there 
was an urgent need to reconcile the incompatible and conflicting 
views. A good deal of behind-the-scenes discussions and 
negotiations were required to accommodate these divergent views.3 
The constitutional structure is a good example of the principle of 
accommodation on matters of substance. It sought to preserve 
within it, the competing beliefs and values of various factions 
which tried to leave an imprint on the holy legal document. It is 
important to note how the Constitution framers were influenced by 
the great Isaiah Berlin's concepts of liberty and moral pluralism. 
His conviction that: 
The old perennial belief in the possibility of realising 
ultimate harmony is a fallacy... that Great Goods can 
collide. But the collision, even if they cannot be 
avoided, can be softened. Claims can be balanced, 
compromises can be reached... Priorities, never final 
and absolute, must be established.4 
As Bertrand Russell puts it, "liberation of creativeness ought to be 
the principle of reform both in politics and in economics."5 To be 
consistent with this principle of reform, any useful political theory 
must seek to incorporate into it two important principles: First, the 
growth and vitality of individuals and communities is to be 
promoted as far as possible; second, the growth of one individual 
or community is to be as minimal as possible at the expense of 
another. According to Bertrand Russell, this principle of social 
reconstruction as applied impersonally in politics, is the principle 
of liberty. Thus liberty in itself, he says, is a negative principle. It 
tells us not to interfere. It condemns all avoidable interferences 
with freedom. Liberty, as the Constituent Assembly envisaged for 
our nation however, was based on Berlin's two concepts of liberty, 
positive liberty which would grant the individual a certain liberty 
to decide for himself/herself and negative liberty which would 
mean the absence of coercion or interference in the individual's 
                                                          
3 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution (2008). 
4ISAIAH BERLIN,The Pursuit of the Ideal in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (1990). 
5 Bertrand Russell, Principles 9: Social Reconstruction(1964). 
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personal life, mainly by the government which is elected by 
exercising positive liberty.6 
When Nehru first introduced the draft of the First Amendment in 
the Lok Sabha on 12 May, 19517, he didn't expect such reversal of 
events, where proponents for curbing free speech would take over 
the floor. Deeply concerned with the issue of freedom of speech, he 
oversaw the deliberations of the Cabinet Committee on the 
Amendment, and he surely did scrutinize the amending bill before 
approving its introduction in the Parliament. Then, as chairman of 
the Select Committee reviewing the bill, he recommended to his 
cabinet that the draft be altered to insert the cautionary word 
'reasonable' to qualify the restrictions on the freedom of speech.8 
However, he himself didn't like the word 'reasonable' as is evident 
in what he wrote to T.T. Krishnamachari stating that it would be an 
invitation for each case concerning the provision to go to the courts, 
instead of being solved at the legislative stage itself.9 
On 29 May, 1951,the Congress Parliamentary Party approved the 
amending bill, having rejected 'in no uncertain terms' a move to 
drop the Select Committee's recommendation to include the word 
'reasonable' as a protection of free expression.10 The First 
Amendment retroactively and prospectively empowered the 
government to impose 'reasonable restrictions' on the freedom of 
expression 'in the interests of the security of the State [replacing the 
words "tends to overthrow the State"], friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence'.11 
                                                          
6 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty (2002). 
7 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.12, Part 2, Cols. 8815-16 (1951). 
8 Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution(1999). 
91 Sarvepalli Gopal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
10 supra note 8, at 49. 
11 INDIA CONST., amended by The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 
1951 
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3. Film Censorship in India 
The legendary director, Andrei Tarkovsky‟s films have contributed 
greatly to Indian cinema. However, they have remained in constant 
conflict with the Soviet Censor Board. It is surprising that his films 
are still able to make the profound effect because of his 
cinematography which is today called „Tarkovskian‟, and for the 
profound philosophical questions that he poses, despite passing 
through heavy and senseless censorship. Soviet censors were 
unhappy with the excess of religious symbolism in „Andrei Rublev’ 
(1966), and as a result, the film was shortened by 25 minutes. 
Tarkovsky was not allowed to make a film for six years following 
its release. Screenings of „The Mirror’ (1975) and „Stalker‟ (1979) were 
limited because of their complex language, and the press either 
gave them negative reviews or kept silent. „Solaris‟ (1972) was more 
or less a successful film. Even though Soviet officials were irritated 
by its philosophical line and its arguments about God and 
cognition – and despite the fact that they demanded more than 40 
changes to it – the film was still well known in the Soviet Union, 
probably because of its space exploration theme which really 
excited the Soviet Union back then during the heights of the Cold 
War.12 
Andrei Smirnov, who directed „Belarus Station’ (1970), a cult Soviet 
film about veterans, remembers the process of working with 
censors. "There were no clearly formulated rules. Everything 
depended on the particular official who said yes or no,” Smirnov 
said. “The Soviet State Committee for Cinematography [Goskino, 
which had to approve completed films] was just the final stage; 
censorship started on the first day of film production. At Mosfilm 
studios, local editors proofread the scripts, after which they were 
discussed by the arts council – a team of filmmakers, screenwriters 
and directors. And this wasn‟t done without the Party Committee, 
                                                          
12 Vida Johnson and Graham Petrie, The Films of Andrei Tarkovsky: A 
Visual Fugue (Indiana University Press, 1994). 
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the local body of the Communist Party. And of course, they closely 
observed the films during filming.”13 
As an Indian, one cannot avoid the clear and frightening 
similarities between stories of Soviet and Indian filmmakers. What 
is worse, is that, the Soviet Union has long collapsed and we've 
been a democracy for a good seventy years and concepts of 
'freedom of speech and expression' and 'liberty' are not new or 
alien to us, as has been discussed before in this paper. Just as 
archaic and draconian laws can be traced back to our colonial roots, 
film certification too is no different. The British established the 
Central Board of Film Certification in the infancy of Indian cinema 
in 1918 and "perceived threats to the reputation of white women as 
well as any allusion to self-governance, the Indian nationalist 
movement, or Indian independence were heavily censored by the 
colonial authorities."14 In independent India, film censorship was 
established by the Cinematograph Act, 195215 which came into 
force on 21st March, 1952. Section 5B of the Act, vested the power of 
pre-release censorship in a Board of Censors (now known as the 
Central Board of Film Certification [hereinafter CBFC]), a non-
judicial administrative body. It reads as follows: 
1) A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion 
of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any 
part of it is against the interests of 19 [the sovereignty and 
integrity of India] the security of the State, friendly relations with 
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or involves 
defamation or contempt of court or is likely to incite the 
commission of any offence. 
2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the Central 
Government may issue such directions as it may think fit setting 
                                                          
13 Ekaterina Sivkova, Artists under pressure: Soviet Filmmakers and 
Censorship Russia Beyond The Headlines (Moscow)(October 19, 
2014),<https://www.rbth.com/arts/2014/10/19/artists_under_pressure_
soviet_filmmakers_and_censorship_40723.html.> 
14 W. MAZZARELLA, Making Sense of Cinema in Late Colonial India, in 
Censorship in South Asia: Cultural Regulation from Sedition to 
Seduction(Indiana University Press, 2009). 
15 The Indian Cinematograph Act, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1952. 
Swagat Baruah  Cinema on Trial: Doctrine of Prior Restraint in Censorship 
29 
 
out the principles which shall guide the authority competent to 
grant certificates under this Act in sanctioning films for public 
exhibition.16 
The 'directions issued by the government' that sub-clause (2) talks 
about were extraordinarily broad, informing the Board that "no 
picture shall be certified for public exhibition which will lower the moral 
standards of those who see it...standards of life ....shall not be so portrayed 
as to deprave the morality of the audience...the prevailing laws shall not be 
so ridiculed as to create sympathy for violation of such laws."17 
This gave the CBFC a carte blanche to ban or disapprove of 
whatever it deemed as immoral or unfit for public viewing. With 
such great subjectivity as 'vice and morality', 'relations between 
sexes', 'indecorous and sensuous postures', there is no room for 
doubt that the toughest  stage for a film must obviously be getting 
clearance from  the Censor Board.  
This is what Gautam Bhatia describes in his new book 'Offend, Shock 
or Disturb' as the 'system of prior restraint'18- the "power to choke 
off the marketplace of ideas at its source."19 Further, one of the 
guidelines directs the Board to ensure that "dual meaning words 
that obviously cater to baser instincts are not allowed"20–a 
guideline which gives a very strong leverage to the Censor Board 
in deciding the filters for obscenity and lewdness in cinema. To 
invoke rationality, the legislator must first confine the wide 
possibilities of irrationality. In order to understand freedom of 
expression in relation to art in India, mainly films, two 
foundational cases must be discussed. 
                                                          
16§5B, TheIndian Cinematograph Act, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1952. 
17 K.A Abbas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 481. 
18 Gautam Bhatia, Offend, Shock or Disturb: Free Speech Under Indian 
Constitution(2016). 
19Id. 
20 The Principles for Guidance in Certifying Films <http:// mib.nic.in/ 
acts/cinematograph-act-1952-and-rules.> 
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4. The Obscenity Test laid down by the Supreme Court 
Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra21 was one of the first landmark 
cases concerning obscenity in art and understanding freedom of 
speech regarding the same. The facts are regarding a book that has 
never failed to garner wrong attention, a book that is classified as 
'pornographic literature'- D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover. 
Copies of the book which were banned were found with certain 
booksellers. They were prosecuted under section 292 of the Indian 
Penal Code which criminalizes the sale and possession of obscene 
books. The petitioners challenged the judgement on two grounds: 
first, that S. 292 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 
IPC) was unconstitutional since it violated Article 19(1)(a); and 
secondly, in any event, Lady Chatterley’s Lover was not an obscene 
book, within the meaning of the provision.  
Back in the late 1950s, in the United States of America, Allen 
Ginsberg's classic poem Howl was on trial for obscenity charges. 
Judge Horn reserved two weeks to decide the verdict of the trial, 
during which he read Ulysses and the court decisions regarding it, 
as well as other materials of legal relevance.22 In his decision, he 
emphasized the importance of the freedoms of speech and press, 
stating that they “are inherent in a nation of free people” and “must 
be protected if we are to remain free, both individually and as a 
nation.”23 Additionally, he addressed a question that had 
resurfaced throughout the trial: could a work of literature be 
considered obscene based on certain words, if it possessed a 
redeeming literary value as a whole? Judge Horn maintained that it 
was not so. The distaste that a group of people hold for 
disagreeable words does not constitute obscenity. Personal dislike 
of certain words does not mean that they are not used within other 
social communities, or that they do not represent a separate 
                                                          
21 A.I.R.1965 S.C.881. 
22„Letters to the Editor‟San Francisco Chronicle (April 1957) in Bill Morgan 
and Nancy J 
Peters, Howl on Trial: The Battle for Free Expression (City Lights Books, 
2006). 
23 Id. 
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culture. This argument was congruent with the decision marked in 
the Roth v. United States case24, (which Judge Horn cited) wherein it 
was determined that a work could not be declared obscene, unless 
it lacked social importance. It was a big win for the Beat poets, 
especially for poets and artists around the world.  
In India, two great authors, Ismat Chughtai and Sadat Hasan 
Manto also stood trial for obscenity under Section 292 of the IPC, 
which will be examined in the later paragraphs. The only crime 
they both claimed to have committed was questioning social 
regulations and revealing a human being's most basic instincts 
through a form of art, with great frankness and candour, which the 
society couldn't bear and nor could the judiciary. Bhatia, in his 
book, mentions this case as being indicative of 'obscenity as a 
weapon of cultural regulation'.25 However, both escaped 
punishment because 'obscenity' as an act had not been defined 
under Section 292 of IPC back then, and also because the 
prosecution failed to prove the Hicklin test as to whether the 
content might actually deprave and corrupt minds that are open to 
such immoral influences.26 In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra27, 
addressing the petitioner's first contention, the Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of Section 292. The grand jurist, Justice 
Hidayatullah noted that Article 19(2): 
...makes an exception in favour of existing laws 
which impose restrictions on the exercise of the right 
in the interests of public decency or morality. Section 
292 doesn't go beyond obscenity which falls directly 
within the words 'public decency and morality' of 
the second clause of the article. Obscenity denotes 
the quality of being obscene which means offensive 
to modesty or decency; lewd, filthy and repulsive. It 
                                                          
24 Roth v. United States, [1957] 354 U.S. 476. 
25 Bhatia, supra note 17, 106. 
26 R v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 2 Q.B. 360. 
27 A.I.R.1965 S.C.881. 
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cannot be denied that it is an important interest of 
the society to suppress obscenity.28 
In the next paragraph, he noted: 
Speaking in terms of the Constitution it can hardly 
be claimed that obscenity which is offensive to 
modesty or decency is within the constitutional 
protection given to free speech or expression, 
because the article dealing with the right itself 
excludes it. That cherished right on which our 
democracy rests is meant for the expression of free 
opinions to change political or social conditions or 
for the advancement of human knowledge. This 
freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions which 
may be thought necessary in the interest of the 
general public and one such is the interest of public 
decency and morality. Section 292 of Indian Penal 
Code, manifestly embodies such a restriction 
because the law against obscenity, of course, 
correctly understood and applied, seeks no more 
than to promote public decency and morality.29 
What is baffling however is Justice Hidayatullah's conflicting 
opinion regarding 'obscenity'. He argues that while obscenity is 
protected under Article 19(1)(a), the decency and morality clause 
permits restricting obscene expression. However, in another part, 
he argues that the purpose of free speech and expression is to 
change political/social conditions or advance human knowledge, 
and consequently, obscenity is unprotected under Article 19(1)(a) 
itself, or in his words, "the article dealing with the right itself 
excludes it."30 
When the court had to take up the job of defining 'obscenity' as in 
Section 292 of IPC, but failed to do so, it revisited the Hicklin test, 
which the prosecutor in the case of Manto-Chugtai trials had failed 
to establish. The Court declared that "obscenity without a 
                                                          
28 RanjitUdeshi v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R.1965 S.C.881. 
29 Id. 
30 Bhatia, supra note 17, at 108. 
Swagat Baruah  Cinema on Trial: Doctrine of Prior Restraint in Censorship 
33 
 
preponderating social purpose or profit cannot have the 
constitutional protection of free speech."31 The Court however 
upheld the 'restriction clause' of the Hicklin test which sought to 
'protect not those who can protect themselves but those whose 
prurient minds take delights and secret sexual pleasure from erotic 
writings.'32 The Court failed to understand how D.H Lawrence 
might actually be making a point about the human 
unconsciousness and what message the book might have for the 
ordinary reader. This is evident from the judgement's last few 
paragraphs: 
The promptings of the unconscious particularly in 
the region of sex is suggested as the message in the 
book. But it is not easy for the ordinary reader to 
find it. The Machine Age and its impact on social 
life, which is secondary theme, does not interest the 
reader for whose protection, as we said, the law has 
been framed.33 
One might conclude from this judgement that the court might have, 
with good intentions, tried to interpret art in regard to the ordinary 
reader, who constitutes the major fraction of our society. However, 
this was a blow to art in India and sought to enforce morality on 
the dissenters and the 'social deviants' rather than enforce rule of 
law on the miscreants. 
5. Censorship in India 
In spite of not being able to recover from poverty since 
independence, Indian leaders and officials have made several 
attempts in the past to stop films depicting abject poverty in India. 
The most famous example for this would be Satyajit Ray's Pather 
Panchali (1955), which is now considered a classic in world cinema- 
a film which won the debutant director, the Best Human Document 
Award at the 1956 Cannes Film Festival. Thanks to Jawaharlal 
Nehru's personal admiration for the film and his appreciation of its 
                                                          
31 Bhatia, supra note26. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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cinematic and humane qualities, the film could make it to Cannes. 
Nehru took the task upon himself, by overriding the opposition of 
government officials, to ensure that Pather Panchali would represent 
India, at Cannes.34 Other reactions were however, mostly philistine 
and unfounded, because it depicted social realities. For many years 
after its release, the trilogy‟s (Pather Panchali, Aparajito, Apur Sansar) 
unanticipated fame outside India, disturbed prosperous Indians – 
especially those working in the commercial film industry of 
Bombay – because of its unsentimental portrayal of poverty. In 
1981, the same official objection to the film was raised in 
Parliament, by Nargis, one of the biggest box-office stars of her 
time, who played the role of the rustic heroine in the 1957 
blockbuster Mother India . She accused Ray of distorting India‟s 
image abroad – first in a parliamentary debate, then in an interview 
that she had given for an Indian magazine, in which she said: 
„What I want is that if Mr. Ray projects Indian poverty abroad, he 
should also show “modern India”.35 
A group of respected Indian filmmakers and writers responded by stating 
that: 
The Modern India you speak of is the India of dams, 
of scientists, steel plants and agricultural reforms. 
Do you honestly believe that it is this India that is 
portrayed in the so-called commercial films of 
Bombay? In fact, the world of commercial Hindi 
films is peopled by thugs, smugglers, dacoits, 
voyeurs, murderers, cabaret dancers, sexual 
perverts, degenerates, delinquents and rapists, 
which can hardly be called representative of Modern 
India.36 
                                                          
34 Andrew Robinson, Satyajit Ray: The Inner Eye: The Biography of a 
Master Film-Maker (University of California Press, 1989). 
35 Andrew Robinson, The Apu Trilogy &India, Himal Southasian 
(Kathmandu)(Dec. 19, 2010), <http:// old.himalmag.com/ component/ 
content/article/3456-the-apu-trilogy-and-india.html.> 
36 Id. 
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A good example for the legal world would be the case of K.A. Abbas 
v. Union of India37, the case of the documentary film A Tale of Four 
Cities (1968) which, like Ray's Pather Panchali depicted poverty and 
inequality in the cities of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The 
Board refused to grant the film a 'U' certificate, a decision affirmed 
on appeal to the Central Government, on the ground that it 
'depicted immoral trafficking  of women and soliciting, prostitution 
or procuration'. K.A. Abbas challenged the Government's decision, 
but by the time the case came up before the Supreme Court, the 
government had agreed to grant it a U certificate without the cuts. 
Consequently, he amended his petition to directly challenge the 
constitutional validity of the Cinematograph Act,1952 and the 
directions that the government must issue under it.38 The Court in 
this case, primarily, didn‟t accept the distinction between prior 
restraint and restraint in general and considered both to be 
governed by the standards of reasonable restrictions within Article 
19(2) of the Indian Constitution. Secondly, following from the first, 
the word „reasonable‟ in the Cinematograph Act was considered 
inconclusive in this regard. The Court referred to the guardianship 
role of the Courts as the legal protector of citizens in preserving 
public interest.39 
5.1 Prior Restraint 
Bhatia lays down his thoughts on a 'regime of prior restraint' as 
follows: 
A regime of complete [emphasis added] prior 
restraint makes the problem far worse because it 
ensures that certain ideas can never even enter the 
marketplace. For post-publication punishment, the 
material in question has at least been placed before 
the public, and has entered the public sphere. Prior 
restraint allows the government immense powers of 
                                                          
37 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 481. 
38 Bhatia, supra note 17, at177. 
39 Abbas v. Union of India, GLOBAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY(blog), < https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/ 
cases/abbas-v-india/> 
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controlling the public sphere by determining what 
the public will have access [emphasis added] to in 
the first place.40 
Prior restraint, as has been mentioned previously in this paper, was 
an instrument of the British, and its applicability today makes not 
only a case of illogical succession of government suppression, but 
also the reflection of the nostalgic feelings of the colonized for its 
colonisers. The Supreme Court however, held that: 
pre-censorship is but an aspect of censorship and 
bears the same relationship in quality to the material 
as censorship after the motion picture has had a run. 
The only difference is one of the stage at which the 
State interposes its regulation between the 
individual and his freedom. Beyond this there is no 
vital difference.41 
This was despite a prior precedent of the Delhi High Court decision 
in the Brij Bhushan case42, which had prudently followed the 
American courts in holding prior restraint, unconstitutional. The 
Court also made the grand presumption of the universal 
recognition 'that the treatment of motion pictures must be different 
from that of other forms of art and expression...the instant appeal 
of the motion picture, its versatility, realism (often surrealism), and 
its coordination of the visual and aural senses...the motion picture 
is able to stir up emotions more deeply than any other product...'43 
Upon a closer look at the judgment, one is reminded of the French 
film critic Andre Bazin's notion of 'objective reality'44 or even the 
legendary Swedish filmmaker Ingmar Bergman's thoughts on 
cinema, when he says "Film has dream, film has music. No form of 
                                                          
40 Bhatia, supra note 17,at 178. 
41 supra note35. 
42 BrijBhushan v. State of Delhi, 1950 S.C.R. 605. 
43 supra note 35. 
44 1 Andre Bazin, What is Cinema,(University of California Press, 2004). 
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art goes beyond ordinary consciousness as film does, straight to 
our emotions, deep into the twilight room of the soul."45 
The conclusion of the Supreme Court was unfounded, as it didn't 
cite and most probably didn't look into film theory before making 
such a grand declaration. Surrealism for example, is still a category 
unexplored by Indian filmmakers and the Supreme Court still 
presumes its hovering existence in India cinema. This case can be, 
however, called as absurd, because in deciding a case on individual 
moral regulation, the court failed to make any point on the 
autonomy of the individual and individual freedom and the liberty 
of the individual under a state, as in the line of thought of Isaiah 
Berlin, who was so frequently cited when the Constituent 
Assembly first debated upon liberty and freedom. The court talked 
about the 'interests of the society' thereby invoking the Ranjit 
Udeshi case46 and how it came before the concept of individual 
morality as "it caters for the mass audience who are generally not 
selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with 
other modes of communication."47 It justified its stance on prior 
restraint, by stating that "cinema cannot be allowed to function in a 
free market place just as does the newspapers or magazines. 
Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but 
also necessary."48 
The flaws can be seen in the court's general approach to moral 
philosophy in matters related to cinema. A movie can never offend 
people, it can at the most, affect certain people or certain sections of 
the society, and it is then that the question of censorship might be 
brought into the court. Cinema as an art form may be intimidating, 
as it is meant to invoke thoughts, stir up the viewer's 
consciousness, fears and desires, through moving images, placed 
not necessarily in order, but meandering like the endless rain or the 
constant sunshine. The primary objective of any art form is to make 
the viewer sacrifice his/her ego and question oneself. 
                                                          
45 Ingmar Bergman, The Magic Lantern: An Autobiography (University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
46 supra note26. 
47 S. Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574. 
48 Id. 
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In the Ranjit Udeshi case, the court took upon itself the task of 
protecting those sections of the society that were ironically most 
vulnerable to corrupt and negative influences. In the Baragur 
Ramachandrappa case49, the Court focused on those communities 
that were most likely to be hurt by the offending text. The case 
concerned the 1995 Karnataka Sahitya Academy award winning 
novel Dharmakaarna which had allegedly offended the sentiments 
and feelings of the Veershaivas and the followers of Basaveshwara, 
a 12th century saint.  Similarly, the Rangarajan case narrowed down 
its observations on free speech and its calibration to the 
constituency that it felt would be most vulnerable in case of 
exposition.50 The Court went on to cite an academic study 
according to which “continual exposure to films of a similar 
character” would significantly affect the attitude of an individual or 
a group. On this basis, it deemed pre-censorship necessary.51 The 
Court interestingly suggested that making factually false claims is a 
ground for censorship which echoes the idea that the goal of free 
speech is to discover the truth. What is problematic with this 
judgement, is its narrow approach to art, as the Court declared  
The motion pictures were originally considered as a 
form of amusement to be allowed to titillate but not 
to arouse. They were treated as mere entertainment 
and not an art or a means of expression. Movie 
motivates thought and action and assures a high 
degree of attention and retention. It makes its impact 
simultaneously arousing the visual and aural senses. 
The movie had unique capacity to disturb and 
arouse feelings. It has as much potential for evil as it 
was for good. It has an equal potential to instil or 
cultivate violent or good behaviour.  
                                                          
49 Sri BaragurRamachandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 11. 
50 supra note 44. 
51 Gautam Bhatia, Free Speech and Public Order – II: Film Censorship and the 
Rangarajan Case, Indian Constitutional Law & Philosophy, (Aug.09, 2013, 
7:22 AM),<https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2013/08/09/free-
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This was an archaic view of art and essentially how the doctrine of 
prior restraint had perpetuated itself. 
6. Judiciary and the Censor Board 
The film Bandit Queen (1994), with its explicit scenes of rape and 
sexual violence, also drew the Censor Board's 'prudish eyes' and 
was denied certification. Rejecting a challenge to the screening of 
the film, the Court held, in the case of Bobby International v. Om Pal 
Singh Hoon52 that "the object of the scenes was not to titillate the 
cinema goer's lust but to arouse in him sympathy for the victim and 
disgust for the perpetrators."53 The Court, finding the scenes to be 
'essential to the film' allowed its screening with an 'A' certificate. 
Hence, according to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on 
obscenity, if it is used to provide a 'social message' for the general 
good, then it can be permitted to be portrayed in a film. Indian 
film-goers and citizens are hence denied their right to autonomy 
and individual freedom, have movies shoved down their throat, 
are told what to watch and why to watch a certain movie. The 
vesting of the wide authority in the government to decide what 
forms of expression people can or cannot be trusted with having 
exposure to, is why the Censor Board today can be so irrationally 
brutal in its functioning. 
In the Rangarajan case, the grant of U-certificate to a film about 
caste-based reservations was revoked by the Madras High Court. 
The revocation was thereafter challenged by the Supreme Court, 
which surprisingly, for perhaps the first time, delivered a scathing 
counter-argument to the State's contention of 'disturbing public 
order'. It held that:  
our commitment to freedom of expression demands 
that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations 
created by allowing the freedom are pressing and 
the community interest is endangered...The 
expression of thought should intrinsically dangerous 
to the public interests. In other words, the 
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expression should be inseparably locked up with the 
action contemplated like the equivalent of a spark in 
a powder keg.54 
The Court essentially ruled that a movie could be considered to be 
dangerous to the public interests only if it 'shouted fire in a 
crowded theatre.'55 This is a commendable judgement from the 
Supreme Court because it recognised the 'effects of cinema' and 
how the viewer must pause and reflect after watching a movie. It 
sought to make a differentiation between such movies and movies 
which inherently might spark a fire. This is to not let the citizens 
from shying away from talking about cultural, political and social 
issues that affect their everyday lives but to exercise their freedom 
of speech and expression for its true value - to express dissent.  
Father, Son & Holy War (1994), a brave documentary on sexual 
violence and communalism in India, was given an 'A' Certificate. 
However, Doordarshan refused to telecast it. In the court, on behalf 
of Doordarshan, it was argued that the film had a high potential to 
spark of communal riots, as it would be viewed by 'illiterate and 
average persons who would be largely affected by its screening.'56 
This was a classic illustration of the colonial treatment of Indian 
citizens as 'subjects', which had continued from the previous cases 
of K.A. Abbas and Rangarajan. However, the Court came to the 
rescue of the documentary and rejected this contention, holding the 
standard to be that of the 'reasonable person', with an 'average, 
healthy and common sense point of view'. The Court also 
concluded that the documentary was neither obscene nor a threat 
to public order and it directed Doordarshan to screen it. 
 
 
                                                          
54 supra note 44. 
55 Brandenburg v. Ohio [1969] 395 U.S. 444. 
56 DG, Directorate-General of Doordarshan v. AnandPatwardhan, (2006) 8 
S.C.C. 433. 
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7. Censor Board and Moral Purity 
In consonance with Justice Hidayatullah's 'cherished right of the 
freedom of speech to advance human knowledge', the Court held 
in the Rangarajan case that 'moral values in particular, shouldn't be 
allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural 
assimilation.' The Court invoked a homogenous Indian identity by 
relying on Indian concepts like 'dharma' which it felt to be the 
'bedrock of Indian civilization'. Dissenting opinion was refused by 
invoking the 'public morality' argument. However, it must be 
understood that India is not solely based upon the principle of 
Dharma, as can be observed from the Indian Constitution. The 
Court also tried to analyse the film's alleged depiction of Dr. 
Ambedkar as anti-egalitarian. After analysing certain scenes, it 
concluded that there was no such depiction, although at the same 
time, it shrewdly added that if such a depiction did exist, it would 
have to be subject to censorship, as Ambedkar cannot be thought of 
being anti-egalitarian. This again reflects India's ill-habit of 
canonization of its freedom fighters and putting them beyond 
historical questioning. If free speech is really to allow different 
views to be expressed by proponents and opponents alike, 
shouldn't it also extend to questioning the historical viewpoint that 
Dr. Ambedkar was a proponent of equality?  
By the Court's reasoning in the Doordarshan case, it is clear that 
films like Lipstick Under My Burkha (2017) or When Harry Met Sejal 
(2017) are way beyond the firing line, as they hardly make a case 
for incitement of violence or lustful thoughts in the minds of the 
excitable crowd. Lipstick Under My Burkha, for example, is a film on 
women‟s sexuality and Indian feminism. The film obviously didn't 
deserve the wrath of the Censor Board, but a careful reflection and 
introspection after viewing. The Censor Board's refusal to grant it a 
clearance certificate implies its sexist mentality and functioning, 
which has found solace in the parallel legal provisions which make 
such censorship possible in the first place. A film scholar recently 
noted, drawing inspiration from the post-colonial theorist Partha 
Chatterjee: 
Film censorship in India exemplified the distinction 
and tension between citizen and population that it is 
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a characteristic feature of contemporary 
democracy... thought the discourse of democracy is 
predicated on the figure of the citizen and its 
corollaries of autonomy, equal rights, and self-
representation, the modernizing agendas of post-
colonial nation-states like India presume 
'populations' which are the objects of the 
government, rather than citizens.57 
8. Conclusion 
The concepts of liberty and individual freedom that were discussed 
in the beginning of this paper were framed by the makers of our 
Constitution, after serious deliberations and discussions. If not for 
those debates, one cannot say for sure how worse the situation of 
censorship and freedom of speech and expression would have 
been, in our country today, keeping in mind that the film industry 
already finds itself in a dark forest of censorship and red-tapism. 
Let us work on a democratic presumption that our government 
does in fact constitute a part of the society. Having said that, to 
draw from J.S. Mill's concept of liberty, society can exercise power 
over any individual only to prevent harm to others, never for the 
good of those individuals themselves.58 
In this paper, the researcher has argued that the doctrine of prior 
restraint dates back to colonial times and that it was primarily used 
for suppressing freedom of speech and expression. This doctrine 
was taken forward by the legislature and complied with, by the 
judiciary. The „obscenity test‟ has always taken a conservative side, 
enforcing maximum curtailment of freedom of speech and 
expression and ever since the Ranjit Udeshi era, has given more 
leverage to the Censor Board and the judiciary to carry on with the 
same. This however, hasn‟t always been for the bad, as it ensured 
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that the complex and diverse social cohesion of the Indian society 
does not wither away. 
However, in contrast to the above statement, the paper has also 
focussed on how the Censor Board‟s carte blanche with regard to 
deciding issues of morality is very dangerous and that this 
emanates from previous Supreme Court rulings, starting from 
Ranjit Udeshi to the Rangarajan case and other such important cases. 
To change the status quo, what is required is that such rulings must 
be discouraged and the judiciary must play a bigger role in curbing 
prior restraint, when it sees prospects for affecting certain societal 
issues positively, most currently, for example, the women‟s 
empowerment issue in India. 
The Supreme Court has very often restricted itself to the 
understanding of censorship in regard to the upkeep of 'public 
morality', and in a display of superiority complex, interpreted the 
standards of the test of the 'reasonable man' (in multiple cases 
discussed in this paper). The Doordarshan case however let some 
ray of light seep in, by holding that not everything that is fiery 
onscreen need be harmful or might be of the potential to corrupt 
people. A lot of legal healing can be achieved by respecting art or 
art forms, which the current Censor Board seems to lack. By 
appointing someone so bigoted like Pahlaj Nihalani, the 
government sends out a strong message regarding its approach to 
cinema, or rather its indifference to it. Censoring certain words like 
'intercourse' or movies because they depict Indian women as not 
mere housewives cooking for their husbands and children, as the 
Censor Board might want them to be, only goes on to present a 
mockery of the Censor Board itself. Such conduct is reminiscent of 
the Soviet censor board or censor boards in dictatorial countries. If 
the government probably makes an attempt to understand why art 
exists in the first place, perhaps it would revise its approach 
towards it. To quote Tarkovsky: 
Some sort of pressure must exist; the artist exists 
because the world is not perfect. Art would be 
useless if the world were perfect, as man wouldn‟t 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 7, No. 2                               ISSN 2278-4322 
 
44 
 
look for harmony but would simply live in it. Art is 
born out of an ill-designed world.59 
Filmmakers have the responsibility to expose lies and tell the truth, 
through the medium that is cinema, question social norms and 
dissent whenever the need arises. Censorship must be used wisely, 
for, it must not try to suppress deviating or dissenting voices, but 
only voices that reek of malice and ill-will, as there is a very clear 
distinction between the two. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint by all 
means, is being misused by the Censor Board, as it doesn't allow 
people to judge and reflect upon a cinema's value. By killing an 
unborn in the womb, it attempts to make social or cultural issues 
non-existent. Morality too, like power, if over-centralised, may lead 
to a nation full of obliging subjects and not argumentative citizens. 
That, for sure, is not what democracy is about. 
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